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AUTHORS’ NOTES 
 
In 2012/2013, the Deakin University School of Law competed in the Willem C. Vis 
International Commercial Arbitration Moot for the twentieth year, and the Vis (East) 
Moot for the tenth. In recognition of this anniversary, and inspired by the publication 
of The Danubia Files, the Deakin Law School has authored this mock partial award 
addressing the 2012/2013 Vis Moot problem. 
The authors would like to thank and acknowledge their fellow 2012/2013 Vis Moot 
team members whose work helped contribute to the arguments put forward in this 
award – Vasudha Akula, Phoebe Blank, Devesh Khanna, Karthik Maganty, Seth Ryan 
and Chimène Vaughan. They would also like to particularly thank Eckart 
Brödermann, Christine Heeg, Thomas Weimann and the Chinese European 
Arbitration Centre for lending the use of the CEAC Rules to the Vis Moot – providing 
a fascinating basis for the 2012/2013 problem.  
We hope you enjoy the analysis which follows, which we are sure will never fully 
settle the issues hotly contested in Hong Kong and Vienna in March 2013, but which 
we hope will nevertheless satisfy Mediterraneo Exquisite Supply Co, Equatoriana 
Clothing Manufacturing Ltd, and their representatives Mr. Fasttrack and Mr. 
Langweiler who (as we all know) after all these years are no strangers to arbitration 
or the CISG! 
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PARTIAL AWARD OF 30 SEPTEMBER 2013 
ISSUED AT THE SEAT OF ARBITRATION, VINDOBONA, DANUBIA 
BY 
PROFESSOR PRESIDING ARBITRATOR 
DR. ARBITRATOR 1 
MS. ARBITRATOR 2 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This is a Partial Award issued in Vindobona, Danubia, in the dispute between 
Mediterraneo Exquis ite Supply Co, Claimant, and Equatoriana Clothing 
Manufacturing Ltd, Respondent. It reflects the unanimous decis ion of the Tribunal and 
is rendered on 30 September 2013. 
2 THE PARTIES’ DISPUTE 
In this Partial Award, the Claimant is referred to as Mediterraneo Supply and the 
Respondent as Equatoriana Manufacturing. Mediterraneo Supply is a corporation 
registered in Mediterraneo, at 45 Commerce Road, Capital City, Mediterraneo and is 
represented by Mr. Horace Fasttrack, Advocate at the Court, of 75 Court Street in 
Capital City, Mediterraneo. Equatoriana Manufacturing is a corporation registered in 
Equatoriana,  at 286 Third Avenue, Oceans ide,  Equatoriana and is represented by Mr. 
Joseph Langweiler, Lawyer, of 14 Capital Boulevard, Oceans ide, Equatoriana. These 
proceedings concern a dispute aris ing out of a contract for the sale of polo shirts 
concluded on 5 January 2011. 1 
This Tribunal has jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute because their contract contains, 
in Cl. 19, the follow ing arbitration clause: 
19. Arbitration. Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to 
this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by 
institutional arbitration administered by the Chinese European Arbitration 
Centre (CEAC) in accordance with the CEAC Hamburg Arbitration Rules.  
(a) The number of arbitrators shall be three unless the amount in dispute is less 
than EUR 100,000 in which case the matter shall be decided by a sole arbitrator;  
                                              
1
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, pp. 12-3. 
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(b) The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be English;  
(c) The arbitration shall be held in Vindobona, Danubia. Hearings may take 
place in other locations.  
(d) The arbitration shall be confidential; 
(e) The parties agree that also the mere existence of an arbitral proceeding shall 
be kept confidential except to the extent disclosure is required by law, regulation 
or an order of a competent court;  
(f) The arbitral tribunal shall apply the CEAC Hamburg Arbitration Rules as in 
force at the moment of the commencement of the arbitration unless one of the 
parties requests the tribunal, within 4 weeks as of the constitutuion of the 
tribunal, to operate according to the CEAC Hamburg Arbitration Rules as in 
force at the conclusion of this contract.  
This clause reflects in substance the model clause of the Chinese European Arbitration 
Centre. As is its duty, the Tribunal has conducted the proceedings in accordance with 
this clause subject to two exceptions : 
1. Paragraph (f) provides for application of the CEAC Hamburg Arbitration Rules as 
in force at the commencement of arbitration. These proceedings commenced on 6 
July 2012; thus paragraph (f) would require application of the CEAC Rules 
effective September 2010. Following the parties’ agreement, it was determined 
that the CEAC Rules effective September 2012 would be applied instead, such 
agreement noted in the arbitral f ile at p. 10, n 1. This agreement means that the 
diff icult questions that may result from temporal conflicts of arbitration rules2 do 
not arise in this case. All references in this Partial Award to the CEAC Rules are 
references to the Rules effective September 2012. 
2. Paragraphs (d) and (e) require the confidentiality of these proceedings. However, 
after becoming apparent that these proceedings raise a number of issues of general 
importance particularly in the context of CEAC arbitration, the parties have agreed 
to waive their confidentiality rights and authorise the publication of this Partial 
Award in full.3 The Tribunal understands from correspondence with Professor Dr. 
Management of CEAC that it w ill make this Partial Award public ly available in 
due course. 
                                              
2
  See Greenberg, G. and Mange, F., “Institutional and Ad Hoc Perspectives on the Temporal Conflict of 
Arbitral Rules” (2010) 27 Journal of International Arbitration  199. 
3
  See CEAC Rules Art. 34(5). 
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As Danubia, the seat of arbitration, has adopted the Model Law with its 2006 
amendments, the Model Law is the lex arbitr i for these proceedings. The parties’ 
adoption of the CEAC Rules is an exercise of their power under Art. 19(1) Model Law 
and has therefore been respected at all times by the Tribunal. Art. 35(1) CEAC Rules 
grants party autonomy rights with respect to the governing rules of law, and the parties 
have exercised those rights through Cl. 20 of their contract which reads as follows: 
20. Applicable Law. This contract shall be governed by the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International  Sale of Goods of 1980 (CISG) 
without regard to any national reservation, supplemented for matters which are 
not governed by the CISG, by the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and these supplemented by the otherwise applicable 
national law.  
This clause is a verbatim adoption of the model CEAC choice of law clause contained 
in paragraph [b] of Art. 35(1) CEAC Rules, with the exception of that model c lause’s 
footnotes. This is recognised at footnote 2 in the parties’ contract4 which cross-
references Art. 35 CEAC Rules.  
Neither party disputes the applicability of the Model Law or the CEAC Rules, or the 
terms of the arbitration agreement and the choice of law clause. 5 While a discrepancy 
does exist between the arbitration agreement as appearing in the contract and the 
Statement of Claim, 6 and while Equatoriana Manufacturing originally accepted as 
correct the clause as recorded in the Statement of Claim,7 it is now clarified that the 
version appearing in Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1 is correct.8 There is however a 
significant area of disagreement as to the validity and effect of the choice of law 
clause.  
Mediterraneo, Equatoriana and Danubia have all adopted the New York Convention. 
Furthermore, all tangible assets of Equatoriana Manufacturing are located in 
Equatoriana. 9 Thus while not applicable in these proceedings per se, as the New York 
Convention will likely govern any enforcement proceedings follow ing the rendering 
of this Partial Award, the Tribunal will be mindful of its provis ions. 
 
                                              
4
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, p. 13. 
5
  See Statement of Defence, p. 36, para. 11. 
6
  Statement of Claim, p. 10, para. 30. 
7
  Statement of Defence, p. 36, para. 11. 
8
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 52, para. 10. 
9
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 56, para. 28B. 
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3 THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
These proceedings originate in the Application for Arbitration filed by Mr. Horace 
Fasttrack for Mediterraneo Supply on 1 July 2012. (The reference to 2 July 2012 in 
the CEAC letter at pp. 22 – 4 of the f ile appears to be a c lerical error, though nothing 
turns on this point.) This Application comprised a Notice of Arbitration 10 as well as a 
Statement of Claim 11 that was accompanied by Claimant’s Exhibit Nos. 1 to 7. In 
accordance with Art. 3(2) CEAC Rules, these proceedings are deemed to commence 
on 6 July 2012. 12 These documents were transmitted to Equatoriana Manufacturing 
pursuant to a CEAC letter dated 12 July 2012, appearing at pp.  27 – 8 of the file, and 
on 4 August Equatoriana Manufacting filed its Response and Statement of Defence13 
accompanied by Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1.  
CEAC confirmed this Tribunal’s full constitution by letter dated 6 September 2012 
appearing at pp. 46 – 7 of the file. The Tribunal, consistuted by three members in 
accordance with paragraph (a) of the arbitration agreement, comprises: 
1. Professor Presiding Arbitrator (Chairperson), of the firm Wise, Strong & Clever, 
25 Court Street, Vindobona, Danubia. 
2. Dr. Arbitrator 1, of 14 Advocate Way, Oceanside, Mediterraneo, appointed by 
Mediterraneo Supply. 
3. Ms. Arbitrator 2, of 414 University Avenue, University City, Equatoriana, 
appointed by Equatoriana Manufacturing. 
Unqualif ied Declarations of Independence and Impartiality were provided by all three 
members of the Tribunal, as noted at p. 45 of the file, pursuant to Art. 11 CEAC Rules. 
The Tribunal notes that by way of subsequent disclosure, Professor Presiding 
Arbitrator had in 2011 / 2012 previously presided over a case (involving a different 
institution) where both Mr. Fasttrack and Mr. Langweiler represented (different) 
parties. No issue was taken to this point, and both parties express ly confirmed that no 
objection was taken to the Tribunal’s constitution or composition. 14 The Tribunal 
notes in passing that Art. 3.1.3 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration of 2004 foresee party appointment on two or more occasions as necessary 
to warrant disclosure, and even then only categorise that matter on the orange list.  
                                              
10
  CEAC Rules Art. 3(1). 
11
  CEAC Rules Art . 20. 
12
  See the CEAC letter on file at pp. 22-4. 
13
  CEAC Rules Arts. 4 and 21. 
14
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 56, para. 32. 
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On 2 October 2012, the Tribunal, through a conference call, authorised Professor 
Presiding Arbitrator to make procedural decis ions subject to the full Tribunal’s 
subsequent confirmation.15 On 4 October 2012, a conference call was then conducted 
between Professor Presiding Arbitrator, Mr. Fasttrack and Mr. Langweiler. Procedural 
Order No. 1 was then issued on 5 October 2012. It was agreed by the parties16 that 
issues of quantum and costs would not be addressed at this stage of the proceedings. 
Consistently with this agreement, this Partial Award resolves issues of liability only.  
It was agreed on 4 October 2012, consistently with Art. 24 CEAC Rules,17 that 
detailed written submissions would be provided by Mediterraneo Supply on 6 
December 2012 and Equatoriana Manufacturing in reply on 17 January 2013. 18 These 
submissions were duly served. It was also agreed19 that further evidence would be 
gathered pursuant to a process involving the raising of questions  on or before 25 
October 2012. This further evidence is recorded in Procedural Order No. 2, issued by 
Professor Presiding Arbitrator on 1 November 2012. It was subsequently clarified that 
Procedural Order No. 2 contained a clerical error by containing two paragraphs [28]. 
While the Order was not revised, for the purposes of this Partial Award these 
paragraphs are referred to as paragraphs [28A] and [28B] for clarity.  
Paragraph (c) of the arbitration agreement confirms (consistently with Art. 18(1) 
CEAC Rules) that hearings may take place outs ide Vindobona, Danubia. Oral hearings 
were conducted in these proceedings from 11 to 17 March 2013 in Hong Kong and 
then from 22 to 28 March 2013 in Vienna. At the conclus ion of those hearings, after 
both parties expressing satisfaction of being accorded the procedural fairness requried 
by Art. 18 Model Law20 and of adequately developing and putting their cases, the 
proceedings were declared closed pursuant to Art. 31(1) CEAC Rules.  
This Partial Award is now rendered on 30 September 2013. Though Art. 31A(1) 
CEAC Rules imposes a nine month limit (in this case 6 June 2013) for the rendering of 
a final award, the parties have agreed to an extens ion of this timeframe for the 
purposes of both this Partial Award and the Final Award which will follow in due 
course. 
 
                                              
15
  See CEAC Rules Art. 33(2). 
16
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 49, para. 9. 
17
  Cf. CEAC Rules Art. 25. 
18
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 50, para. 12. 
19
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 50, para. 11. 
20
  See also CEAC Rules Art. 17(1). 
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4 THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE, THE PARTIES’ POSITION AND THEIR 
REQUESTS FOR RELIEF 
This dispute arises out of a contract between the parties dated 5 January 2011 
concerning the sale of 100,000 polo shirts.21 These shirts were to conform to 
specifications set out in Annex 1 to the contract22 and there is no dispute in relation to 
these requirements23 such that Annex 1 was never tendered in evidence. The dispute 
instead concerns allegations of late delivery, and a further breach of contract aris ing 
from the alleged use of child labour by Equatoriana Manufacturing.  
With respect to the alleged late delivery, the parties’ contract nominated a delivery 
date of 19 February 2011. 24 Pursuant to the FAS Incoterm adopted (as understood 
according to Incoterms 2010), Oceanside, Equatoriana was the nominated place of 
delivery. 25 Thus under the contract as it stood on 5 January 2011, Equatoria na 
Manufacturing was to deliver the goods at Oceanside, Equatoriana, ready for loading 
on 19 February 2011. 26 No dispute arises up to this point. What is in dispute, is 
whether the contractual delivery date was orally amended to 24 February 2011 as a 
result of a telephone call which took place on 9 February 2011. This implicates three 
separate legal questions which must be resolved by this Partial Award: 
1. The parties each tendered witness statements composed by their respective 
officers involved in the 9 February 2011 telephone conversation. Respondent’s 
Exhibit No. 1 is the witness statement of Mr. Tomas Short, who was unable to 
appear for questioning at the oral hearings. Mediterraneo Supply has argued (and 
Equatoriana Manufacturing has contested) that given  his absence this witness 
statement should not be admitted into evidence. 
2. Clause 20 of the parties’ contract purports to choose the CISG as a governing law, 
without regard to any national reservations, however the State of Mediterraneo has 
made a written form declaration pursuant to Art. 96 CISG. Mediterraneo Supply 
has argued that Cl. 20 does  not displace the operation of Mediterranean written 
form requirements, and that as a matter of law no oral amendment could take 
place. Equatoriana Manufacturing disputes this point, arguing that freedom of 
form applies to any amendment which may have occurred. 
                                              
21
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, pp. 12-3. 
22
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, p. 12, Cl. 1. 
23
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 52, para. 9. 
24
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, p. 12, Cl. 3. 
25
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, p. 12, Cl. 2; FAS Incoterms 2010, Cll. A4 & B4. 
26
  Cf. Procedural Order No. 2, p. 53, para. 15. 
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3. On the bas is that oral modifications are permissible at law, Equatoriana 
Manufacturing contends that an oral amendment to the de livery date did in fact 
occur. This is contested by Mediterraneo Supply, who ultimately claims  $ 27,500 
USD calculated in accordance with Cl. 10(b) of the parties’ contract27 on the basis 
of Equatoriana Manufacturing breaching the original contractual delivery date.  
The context to this telephone call (and the oral amendment issue) is that Mediterraneo 
Supply is in the business of procuring goods for distr ibution to other members of its 
corporate group28 and had contracted with Equatoriana Manufacturing for 100,000 
polo shirts after a previous third party contract to procure “Yes Casual”  brand polo 
shirts for the related entity Doma Cirun went unperformed due to supplier 
bankruptcy.29 The original contractual delivery date would have allowed Doma Cirun 
to have the replacement “Yes Casual” polo shirts ready for sale on 15 March 2011, the 
launch date of the summer selling season.30 The 9 February 2011 telephone call was 
prompted by unexpected industrial action in Equatoriana Manufacturing’s supply 
chain causing one of its suppliers to fail in delivering necessary supplies on time.31 
The new delivery date discussed in the telephone call was 24 February 2011 32 and the 
shirts were delivered on that date, 33 arriving in Doma Cirun stores on 20 March 
2011.34 With respect to Mediterraneo Supply’s claim for late delivery, the parties are 
fundamentally at odds as to whether the telephone call reflected merely a practical 
adjustment to performance which remained in breach by f ive days 35 or an actual 
amendment to the contractual delivery date meaning performance was in fact timely. 36 
Before departing from the allegation of late delivery, the Tribunal notes that 
Mediterraneo Supply’s c laim (US$ 27,500) is relatively small compared to the total 
sum at stake in these proceedings. This matter was discussed at the conference call of 
4 October 2012.37 Notwithstanding both parties’ awareness that their legal fees and 
arbitration costs may exceed the damages claimed for delay,38 it was agreed that full 
argument on all three delay-related issues should be heard. 39 Given this agreement40 
                                              
27
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, p. 12. 
28
  Statement of Claim, p. 5, paras. 5 and 7; Cf. Statement of Defence, p. 35, para. 1. 
29
  Statement of Claim, p. 6, para. 8; Claimant’s Exhibit No. 2, p. 14, para. 1. 
30
  Statement of Claim, pp. 6-7, paras. 8–11; Claimant’s Exhibit No. 2, p. 14, paras. 1–3; see also Statement 
of Defence, p. 35, para. 6. 
31
  Claimant’s Exhibit  No. 2, p. 14, para. 4; Procedural Order No. 2, p. 53, para. 12. 
32
  Statement of Claim, p. 7, para. 13. 
33
  Statement of Claim, p. 7, para. 17; Statement of Defence, p. 35, para. 8. 
34
  Statement of Claim, p. 8, para. 17. 
35
  Statement of Claim, p. 11, para. 33. 
36
  Statement of Defence, p. 36, para. 14. 
37
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 48, para. 3. 
38
  See CEAC Schedule of Costs, para. 2; see also Annex to the CEAC Schedule of Costs. 
39
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 48, para. 3. 
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and the parties’ mandatory r ights to procedural fairness,41 both of which are 
considerations  relevant to enforcement,42 the Tribunal reluctantly acceded to this 
request. This has undoubtedly added to the time taken and cost incurred in these 
proceedings, however given the fundamental importance of party autonomy in 
international commercial arbitration 43 the decision was and is ultimately that of the 
parties. 
The breaches Mediterraneo Supply alleges concerning the use of child labour 
represent, by way of contrast, the bulk of its claim. These alleged breaches stem from 
three peculiar aspects of this case – the high ethical standards observed by ( i) the 
Oceania Plus Enterprises group which includes Mediterraneo Supply 44 and (ii)  the 
Oceanian market in general,45 as well as (iii) the reflection of those ethical standards 
in contracts entered into by members of the Oceania Plus Enterprises corporate group.  
Mediterraneo Supply had previously contracted with Equatoriana Manufacturing, in 
2008.46 At that time, pursuant to group policy, Equatoriana Manufacturing was 
audited for compliance with Oceania Plus Enterprises’ ethical policy – suspic ions of 
child labour use were raised though the evidence was not clear and after discussions 
the audit was approved. 47 Given the rush bas is of the present contract, no further audit 
was conducted on this occasion. 
Shortly after the “Yes Casual”  polo shirts became available for sale, on 5 April 2011, 
a television broadcast alleged the use of child labour at Equatoriana Manufacturing  
facilities, including the employment of children as young as eight working in 
appalling conditions.48 A subsequent newspaper artic le published on 8 April 2011 
discussed generally the use of child labour in leading national and international f irms 
with a focus on the technology and c lothing industries.49 While the “Yes Casual” polo 
shirts were not the subject of the television broadcast50 and while there is no evidence 
                                                                                                                              
40
  See Model Law Art. 19(1). 
41
  Model Law Art. 18; see also CEAC Rules Art. 17(1). 
42
  Model Law Arts. 34(2)(a)(ii) & (iv); New York Convention Arts. V(1)(b) & (d). 
43
  See Blackaby, N., Partasides, C., Redfern, A and Hunter, M.,  Redfern and Hunter on International 
Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 5th ed., (2009), at p. 365, para. 6.08; Born, G.,  International 
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer, (2009), at pp. 82-4; S.A. Coppée Lavalin N.V. v Ken-Ren Chemicals 
and Fertilizers Ltd (in liq) (1995) 1 AC 38, 51-2 (Lord Mustill). 
44
  Statement of Claim, p. 6, para. 6. 
45
  Statement of Claim, p. 6, para. 20. 
46
  Statement of Claim, p. 6, para. 9. 
47
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 2, p. 14, para. 2; Statement of Claim, p. 6, para. 9; Cf. Statement of Defence, p. 
35, para. 3. 
48
  Statement of Claim, p. 8, para. 18; see Claimant’s Exhibit No. 5, p. 18, para. 1. 
49
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 4, p. 17; Statement of Claim, p. 8, para. 19. 
50
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 54, para. 17; Statement of Claim, p. 8, para. 18. 
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that the newspaper article spec ifically implicated Equatoriana Manufacturing 51 and 
similarly did not implicate the polo shirts,52 Mediterraneo Supply alleges that severe 
consequences resulted.53 Doma Cirun avoided its contract with Mediterraneo Supply 
on 8 April 2011, and Mediterraneo Supply in turn purported to avoid its contract with 
Equatoriana Manufacturing. 54 
Mediterraneo Supply contends that by us ing child labour, Equatoriana Manufacturing 
breached the parties’ contract in such a way as to justify its avoidance as well as a 
claim for damages and restitution.55 Its Statement of Claim 56 alleged one breach of 
contract, namely lack of conformity with the “Yes Casual” shirts’ particular purpose, 
and this alleged breach appears to be the bas is of its purported termination. 57 During 
oral argument, a second breach of contract was alleged by Mediterraneo Supply, being 
breach of Cl. 12 as an express term of the parties’ contract.58 Though not raised in its 
Statement of Claim, this argument related to the same circumstances as the breach 
already alleged. 59 Article 1 IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrato rs establish 
a duty on the Tribunal to provide a ‘ just and effective resolution of [the parties’] 
disputes’ and this instrument is binding on this Tribunal in the context of CEAC 
arbitration.60 Considering this duty of the Tribunal, its discretion over the conduct of 
the proceedings 61 and its view that allowing the alternative claim would not be 
“inappropriate” w ithin the meaning of Art. 22 CEAC Rules, the second alleged breach 
was entertained during oral argument and Equatoriana Manufacturing took no 
objection. Nonetheless, Equatoriana Manufacturing’s position was62 and is 63 that it did 
not breach its obligations in any respect. It further and in the alternative disptues 
Mediterraneo Supply’s right to avoid. 64 
                                              
51
  See Claimant’s Exhibit No. 5, p. 18, para. 2. 
52
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 54, para. 17. 
53
  Statement of Claim, pp. 8-10, paras. 20-1 and 26-9; Claimant’s Exhibit No. 5, p. 18, para. 3; Claimant’s 
Exhibit No. 6, p. 20, para. 2. 
54
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 5, pp. 18-9, para. 4; Claimant’s Exhibit No. 6, p. 20, para. 3; Statement of Claim, 
p. 9, paras. 22-23; cf. Statement of Defence, p. 35, para. 9. 
55
  Statement of Claim, p. 11, paras. 34-6. 
56
  Statement of Claim, p. 11, para. 34. 
57
  Claimant's Exhibit No. 6, p. 20, para. 3. 
58
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, p. 12 . 
59
  See Statement of Claim, p. 11, para. 34. 
60
  Statutes for the Chinese European Arbitration Centre Art. 2(5); see also Brödermann, E., “The Chinese 
European Arbitration Centre – An Introduction to the CEAC Hamburg Arbitration Rules” (2013) 30 
Journal of International Arbitration 303, at p. 314. 
61
  CEAC Rules Art. 17(1). 
62
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 7, p. 21, para. 3; Statement of Claim, p. 9, para. 24; Statement of Defence, p. 36, 
para. 10. 
63
  Statement of Defence, p. 36, paras. 13 and 15. 
64
  Statement of Defence, p. 36, para. 13; Cf. para. 15. 
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At the time of Mediterraneo Supply’s purported avoidance, Equatoriana 
Manufacturing denied the use of child labour in the production of the “Yes Casual”  
polo shirts.65 This denial was repeated in its Statement of Defence.66 There was, and 
remains, no direct evidence before the Tribunal that ( i) child labour w as used by 
Equatoriana Manufacturing in the production of the “Yes Casual” polo shirts, (ii) child 
labour was used by Equatoriana Manufacturing in its broader operations at or  around 
the time of the parties’ contract, or (iii) Equatoriana Manufacturing has  ever used 
child labour in its operations. Pursuant to Art. 27(1) CEAC Rules, each party bears the 
burden of proving the facts upon which it relies. The only use of child labour actually 
established on the record is use by an Equatoriana Manufacturing supp lier as disclosed 
in the 2008 audit.67 The child labour allegations were discussed during the 4 October 
2012 conference call. At that time it was agreed, for the purposes of this arbitration, 
that (without admiss ion) it would be assumed that Equatoriana Manufacturing had 
used child labour in at least one of its plants, but that no child labour had been used in 
the production of the “Yes Casual” polo shirts at issue in this dispute.68 This is the 
basis upon which the breach of contract issues relating to child  labour have been 
considered by the Tribunal.  
5 THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL 
Four issues thus fall for determination by the Tribunal in this Partial Award: 
1. What is the admissibility of Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1?  
2. As a matter of law, are oral modifications to the parties’ contract permitted?  
3. If such modifications are permitted, did an oral modification of the original 
delivery date in fact occur? 
4. Was Equatoriana Manufacturing, on the bas is of the child labour agreement, in 
breach of its obligations – and was Mediterraneo Supply entitled to avoid the 
contract? 
These issues are now be addressed in turn. 
 
                                              
65
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 7, p. 21, para. 2. 
66
  Statement of Defence, p. 36, para. 15. 
67
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 51, para. 3. 
68
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 49, para. 8. 
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5.1. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF RESPONDENT’S EXHIBIT NO. 1 – THE 
WITNESS STATEMENT OF MR. TOMAS SHORT 
Equatoriana Manufacturing takes no issue as to the admissibility of C laimant’s Exhibit 
No. 2, being the witness statement of Mr. Russell Long. The parties’ evidentiary 
dispute centres around Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1 – the statement of Mr. Tomas 
Short. Mediterraneo Supply takes issue with this statement’s admissibility as Mr. 
Short was unable to appear for questioning at either oral hearing. 69 While domestic 
legal systems differ in treating evidentiary issues as procedural or substantive in 
nature, they are squarely procedural in Model Law arbitrations.70 Nevertheless, during 
the 4 October 2012 conference call, Professor Presiding Arbitrator ruled that this issue 
should be argued before the full tr ibunal71 and that argument was duly heard. The 
matter now falls to be resolved in this Partial Award. 
5.1.1. MEDITERRANEO SUPPLY’S POSITION 
Mediterraneo Supply’s position during the 4 October 2012 conference call72 was that 
Mr. Short’s statement should be disregarded as he had indicated he would not attend 
the oral hearings. When those hearings took place in March 2013 Mr. Short (as 
expected) did not appear and Mediterraneo Supply maintains that his statement must 
be exc luded. While some discussion took place during the oral hearings as to the 
possibility of admitting the statement and simply according it the evidentiary weight it 
deserves, Mr. Fasttrack’s instructions remain that Mediterraneo Supply seeks the 
statement’s exclus ion and that is the bas is upon which its case was presented.  
Mediterraneo Supply contended that the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration of 2010 should be applied to resolve this issue. It noted the 
Tribunal’s procedural discretions with respect to witness examination and the 
admissibility of evidence73 as well as the Tribunal’s broad procedural discretion74 
provide ample authority on general principles to exclude the statement. Mediterraneo 
Supply argued that notwithstanding they were not chosen by the parties, 75 the IBA 
Rules should be utilised to resolve this issue for several reasons. Primarily, it 
emphas ised that the provis ions referred to above may give the Tribunal relevant 
                                              
69
  Procedural Order No. 1, pp. 48-9, paras. 4-5. 
70
  Holtzmann, H. and Neuhaus, J., A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration – Legislative History and Commentary, Kluwer (1989), at p. 567; see also Model Law Art. 
19(2). 
71
  Procedural Order No. 1, pp. 489, para. 5. 
72
  Procedural Order No. 1, pp. 48-9, paras. 4-5. 
73
  CEAC Rules Arts. 27(4) and 28(2). 
74
  Model Law Art. 19(2). 
75
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 55, para. 25. 
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evidentiary powers but do not spec ify how those powers are to be exercised; and that 
the IBA Rules ‘are des igned to supplement the legal provisions and the institutional 
rules that apply to the conduct of the arbitration’.76 It noted that Art. 19(2) Model Law 
provides a legal basis for the Tribunal’s adoption of the IBA Rules in the absence of 
party agreement.  
Mediterraneo Supply relied on Art. 4.7 IBA Rules to support the exclus ion of Mr. 
Short’s statement. Article 4.7 IBA Rules provides that a w itness statement must be 
disregarded if the witness is requested to prov ide oral testimony, fails to appear 
without a valid reason, and there are no exceptional circumstances justifying admitting 
the statement. Mediterraneo Supply argued that its request for examination during the 
4 October 2012 conference call77 was a request within the meaning of Art. 8.1 IBA 
Rules; Mr. Short’s reasons for non-attendance78 are not “valid reasons”; nor are there 
“exceptional circumstances”. It supported this argument by reference to its mandatory 
rights 79 to procedural fairness,80 arguing that admitting the statement without the 
opportunity to test it would contravene those standards. Mediterraneo Supply referred 
the Tribunal to Art. 27(1) CEAC Rules and emphasised that Equatoriana 
Manufacturing has the burden of proving the evidence it seeks to rely on. It argued 
that this must necessarily occur by way of admissible evidence.  
5.1.2. EQUATORIANA MANUFACTURING’S POSITION 
Equatoriana Manufacturing submitted, to the contrary, that the IBA Rules should not 
be applied by the Tribunal. It further submitted that whether or not they are so applied, 
Mr. Short’s witness statement should be admitted without supporting oral testimony. 
Equatoriana Manufacturing referred the Tribunal to the IBA’s own Work ing Party 
which explained that ‘there is not a s ingle best way to conduct all international 
arbitrations’; flexibility is especially important; the IBA Rules do not intend to limit 
that flexibility; and they should be used in the manner that best suits parties and 
tribunals.81 It submitted that the only procedural rules binding on the Tribunal are the 
CEAC Rules, chosen by the parties. Equatoriana Manufacturing took no issue with 
                                              
76
  IBA Rules Preamble 1; see also 1999 IBA Working Party & 2010 IBA Rules of Evidence Review 
Subcommittee, Commentary on the Revised Text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration (2010) International Bar Association, at p. 3, available at: 
<http://www. ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx# takingevidence
>. 
77
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 48, para. 4. 
78
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 55, para. 26. 
79
  Binder, P., International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law 
Jurisdictions, Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed. (2010), at p. 282, para. (5-018). 
80
  Model Law Art. 18; see also CEAC Rules Art. 17(1). 
81
  Supra fn 76, at pp. 3-4; see also IBA Rules Preamble 2. 
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Mediterraneo Supply’s analys is of Arts. 27(4) & 28(2) CEAC Rules per se, however 
argued that these provisions must be read against Art. 27(2) CEAC Rules which 
provide for the prima fac ie admissibility of w itness statements ‘[u]nless otherwise 
directed by the arbitral tribunal’. To further support its contention against use of the 
IBA Rules, Equatoriana Manufacturing referred to the Preamble of the Rules 
themselves which note the “overriding principle” 82 that parties are ‘entitled to know, 
reasonably in advance […] the evidence on which the other [p]arties rely’.83 
Equatoriana Manufacturing argued that addition to the IBA Rules having no 
application in law, as a matter of policy they should also be disregarded as this case in 
no way implicates this overarching policy concern. 
Equatoriana Manufacturing argued, contrary to Mediterraneo Supply’s pos ition, that 
excluding Mr. Short’s statement would actually infringe its own due process rights. It 
emphas ised that Mr. Short’s statement is its sole piece of evidence concerning the 
alleged oral amendment to the contractual delivery date. Thus it contended that the 
statement’s exclus ion would leave the Tribunal to assess this merits issue solely on the 
basis of evidence adduced by Mediterraneo Supply with Equatoriana Manufacturing 
having no r ight of contradiction. On this bas is, it argued that whether or not the IBA 
Rules are applied, Mr. Short’s statement should nevertheless be received into 
evidence. To further support this contention Equatoriana Manufacturing noted that ( i) 
any oral testimony of Mr. Short would be unlikely to assist the Tribunal given that his 
statement largely comprises a retrospective opinion of how he interpreted the 9 
February 2011 telephone conversation which cannot readily be proven or disproven as 
fact, and (ii) Mr. Short has left the employ of Equatoriana Manufacturing84 meaning it 
has no power to compel his attendance and furthermore the laws of both Danubia and 
Equatoriana do not provide for him to be summoned through either States’ courts.85 
5.1.3. THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS AND DECISION 
The due process implications of this issue, reinforced by Arts. 34(2)(a)(ii) & (iv) 
Model Law and Arts. V(1)(b) & (d) New York Convention, have required the Tribunal 
to carefully cons ider this evidentiary point. After closely reviewing the parties’ 
submissions, the Tribunal has decided that the witness statement of Mr. Short should 
be admitted into evidence.  
The Tribunal acknow ledges its evidentiary discretions under Arts. 27(4) & 28(2) 
CEAC Rules, however agrees with Equatoriana Manufacturing that Art. 27(2) CEAC 
                                              
82
  Supra fn 76, at. p. 4. 
83
  IBA Rules Preamble 3. 
84
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 48, para. 4; Procedural Order No. 2, p. 55, para.  26. 
85
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 56, para. 28A; cf. Waincymer, J., Procedure and Evidence in International 
Arbitration, Kluwer (2012), at p. 70. 
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Rules provides for the prima fac ie admissibility of witness statements. Though 
frequently resorted to in international arbitration,86 there is no need to apply the IBA 
Rules as a gap-filling mechanism in this specif ic context. As the Tribunal will not 
apply the IBA Rules, it is unnecessary to dec ide whether Mr. Short’s reasons for non-
attendance are “valid” or the circumstances “exceptional” within the meaning of Art. 
4.7 IBA Rules. 
The Tribunal notes the due process difficulties this issue ostens ibly raises for each 
party. This Tribunal does have a duty to use its best efforts to render an enforceable 
award.87 However, the parties’ own choice of procedural rules provide for the prima 
facie admissibility of witness statements88 and in this case by following the parties’ 
“stipulated procedural norms” the Tribunal is best able to comply with its duty89 
particularly given that party agreement is specif ically referred to in Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) 
Model Law and Art. V(1)(d) New York Convention.  
Though finding that Mr. Short’s witness  statement is admissible, and despite the due 
process implications this issue raised, the Tribunal notes that (as w ill become clear in 
its analys is of Art. 8 CISG) this finding ultimately has little impact on the resolution of 
Mediterraneo Supply’s US$ 27,500 claim for alleged delay.  
5.2. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF ORAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE 
PARTIES’ CONTRACT AT LAW 
During the 4 October 2012 conference call, Mr. Fasttrack requested Professor 
Presiding Arbitrator to rule as a matter of law that any amendments to the parties’ 
contract required written form. 90 This request was based on the State of 
Mediterraneo’s dec laration under Art. 96 CISG which was made upon ratification and 
duly deposited, 91 Art. 96 CISG implicating written form requirements for ‘a contract 
of sale or  its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance, or 
other indication of intention’. 
Freedom of form is the default rule under the CISG.92 Parties  to CISG contracts have 
the right to incorporate “no oral modification” clauses 93 however the parties in this 
                                              
86
  Karrer, P., “Law, Para-Regulatory Texts and People in International Arbitration: Predictability or Fureur 
Reglementaire?” in Kröll, S., Mistelis, L., Perales Viscasillas, P. and Rogers, V.  (eds), International 
Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution – Liber Amicorum 
Eric Bergsten, Kluwer (2011), at pp. 291-2. 
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  See generally supra fn 85, Waincymer, at pp. 97-102. 
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  CEAC Rules Art. 27(2). 
89
  Supra fn 85, Waincymer, at pp. 99-100. 
90
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 49, para. 6. 
91
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 56, para. 35. 
92
  CISG Art. 11; see also CISG Art. 29(1). 
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case did not do so and there are further no established industry practices relating to 
such clauses or oral modifications in general. 94 This issue is therefore entirely one as 
to the applicable law and its effect. While determination of the applicable substantive 
law in arbitration is a procedural issue95 and Professor Presiding Arbitrator was 
authorised on 2 October 2012 to make procedural determinations, 96 this issue was 
considered outs ide the scope of that authorisation 97 and thus must now be resolved in 
this Partial Award. 
The parties’ choice of law clause98 adopts the CISG ‘without regard to any national 
reservation’. The parties disagree on whether those words displace the Art. 96 CISG 
declaration of the State of Mediterraneo, as well as the effect of the Art. 96 CISG 
declaration should it be found applicable.  
5.2.1. MEDITERRANEO SUPPLY’S POSITION 
Mediterraneo Supply did not advance what might have been the obvious argume nt, in 
light of Art. 12 CISG, that the effect of an Art. 96 CISG declaration cannot be 
derogated from. Indeed, at the oral hearings it acknowledged that a tr ibunal would 
rightly be hes itant in f inding an institution’s model choice of law clause (formulated  
on the basis of extens ive research and consultation) ineffective. Instead, its argument 
was far more nuanced – it submitted that Cl. 20 does not actually intend to exclude the 
operation of Mediterraneo’s Art. 96 CISG declaration. It then argued that, the 
declaration being applicable, any modification to the parties’ contract required written 
form. 
Mediterraneo Supply contended first, that the reference to “national reservation”  
within the Art. 35(1) CEAC Rules, paragraph [b] model choice of law clause (adopted 
by the parties) refers to a now outdated reservation of the People’s Republic of China 
and does not purport to exclude the State of Mediterraneo’s off ic ial Art. 96 CISG 
declaration. It secondly contended that as a matter of public policy, where any party 
has its place of business in an Art. 96 CISG reservatory State, any contractual 
amendments require written form. It relied on the US District Court authority of 
Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co Ltd v Microflock Textile Group 
                                                                                                                              
93
  CISG Art. 29(2); see also CISG Art. 6. 
94
  Procedural Order No. 2, pp. 52-3, para. 11. 
95
  Park, W. W. “Arbitrators and Accuracy” (2010) 1  Journal of International Dispute Settlement 25, at p. 
46, fn 106; Waincymer, J., “International Arbitration and the Duty to Know the Law” (2011) 28 Journal 
of International Arbitration 201, at p. 207. 
96
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 48, para. 1. 
97
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 49, para. 6. 
98
  Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1, p. 13, Cl. 20. 
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Corporation.99 In that case, a plaintiff was granted summary judgment on a claim for 
unpaid invoices under a US – China contract. Given the Chinese Art. 96 CISG 
declaration, it was held that as a matter of law any alleged contractual modifications 
were required to be evidenced in writing and no such evidence had been led. 
Mediterraneo Supply therefore argued that Art. 96 CISG’s effect here is to infer an 
obligation for the parties to comply with Mediterraneo’s form require ments. Those 
requirements are that all international sales contracts and any amendments to them 
must be in writing. 100 
5.2.2. EQUATORIANA MANUFACTURING’S POSITION 
Equatoriana Manufacturing’s primary submission was that Cl. 20 does exclude the 
Mediterranean Art. 96 CISG dec laration. It argued that irrespective of the CEAC 
Rules’ history and their Sino – European context,101 Cl. 20 is clear and unambiguously 
expresses the intent to disregard any national reservations. Preamble D CEAC Rules 
confirms that those Rules may be used in arbitrations where neither party is from 
China. 102 Thus the Art. 96 CISG dec laration of Mediterraneo is within the scope of the 
reservations exc luded by Cl. 20 and the writing requirements of that State do not 
apply. Equatoriana Manufacturing argued that to the extent Art. 12 CISG appears to 
preclude this result, Cl. 20 should be interpreted as  choosing the CISG as “rules of 
law” rather than “law” per se103 in order to give effect to and validate the parties’ clear 
intent. 
Equatoriana Manufacturing further argued that even if Mediterraneo’s Art. 96 CISG 
declaration applies, it does not automatically enliven that State’s wr iting requirements 
and oral modifications are nonetheless permitted. In support it relied on the US Third 
Circuit Court of Appeal authority of Forestal Guarani SA v Daros International Inc104 
In that case a Distr ict Court decis ion automatically applying Argentinian written form 
requirements to a US – Argentina contract was vacated. It was held that the proper 
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  Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co Ltd v Microflock Textile Group Corporation (2008) 66 
UCC Rep Serv 2d (Callaghan) 716. 
100
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 56, para. 34. 
101
  See generally Weimann, T ., Heeg, C. and Hasenstab, S., “CEAC Arbitration – Bridging the Gap 
Between China and Europe” in Christ ian Klausegger et al (eds.), Austrian Yearbook on International 
Arbitration 2013, Manz’sche Verlags-und Universitätsbuchhandlung (2013) at pp. 125 and 134-7. 
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  See also Moens, G. and Sharma, R., “The CEAC Hamburg Arbitration Rules: A European -Chinese 
Trade-Related Adaptation of the Revised UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010”  (2013) 79 Arbitration – 
The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management  138, at p. -139. Cf. 
Wilske, S. and Fox, T ., “The Global Competition for the “Best” Place for International Arbitration – 
Myth, Prejudice, and Reality Bits” in Klausegger, C. et al (eds.), Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2009, 
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  As to the difference – see supra fn 43, Born, at pp. 2143–4; see also supra fn 102, Moens. and Sharma, 
at p. 154. 
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  Forestal Guarani SA v Daros International Inc (2010) 613 F.3d 395. 
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approach, once an Art. 96 CISG dec laration is found applicable, is to treat form as an 
internal gap under Art. 7(2) CISG – and that given the CISG’s general principles do 
not assist, the forum’s private international law must be applied to identify the law 
governing form. Equatoriana Manufacturing conceded this analys is must be adapted to 
the arbitration context as this Tribunal does not have a forum 105 thus the procedures 
for identifying the governing law specific to arbitration must be applied instead.106 
Applying the closest connection test, Equatoriana Manufacturing argued that 
Equatorianian law applies. That law does not require written form107 and thus oral 
modifications to the contract may be made.  
5.2.3. THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDING AND DECISION 
Though Mediterraneo Supply’s claim for delay comprises only a fraction of its total 
claim in this arbitration, this issue has required careful consideration by the Tribunal. 
The applicability and effect of an Art. 96 CISG dec laration raises significant issues in 
the context of CEAC arbitration where the Art. 35(1) CEAC Rules, paragraph [b] 
model choice of law clause has been adopted. The Tribunal has decided that as a 
matter of law, oral modifications to the parties’ contract are permitted. The Tribunal 
has found that (as submitted by Mediterraneo Supply) Cl. 20 does not intend to 
exclude Mediterraneo’s Art. 96 CISG dec laration, but that (as submitted by 
Equatoriana Manufacturing) ultimately Equatorianian law governs the issue of form 
and imposes no writing requirements. 
As a preliminary matter, the Tribunal notes that some discussion occurred at the oral 
hearings about the difference between a “declaration” (the terminology used in Art. 96 
CISG) and a “reservation” (that used in Cl. 20). Consistently with the scholarly 
literature on Art. 96 CISG, 108 the Tribunal considers these terms to be interchangeable 
and this difference in terminology is not material in resolving this issue.  
The Tribunal’s starting point must be that Cl. 20 is a verbatim adoption of the model 
CEAC choice of law clause contained in paragraph [b] of Art. 35(1) CEAC Rules. 
This context is important in properly understanding the clause’s intent and effect. 
Authoritative insight is provided by Brödermann and Weimann 109 who explain this 
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  Poudret, J. and Besson, S., Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Stephen Berti and Annette 
Ponti trans, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed. (2007), at pp. 85 and 114; Nygh, P., “Choice of Forum and Law” 
in International Commercial Arbitration  (1997) 24 Forum Internationale 1, at p. 6. 
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  Schlechtriem, P., Sch wenzer, I. and Hachem, P., “Article 96” in Schwenzer, I.  (ed.), Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer – Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed., (2010), at pp. 1192-3, para. 3. 
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  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 56, para. 34. 
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  See, e.g., supra fn 106, at pp. 1192-3, paras. 1-4. 
109
  Brödermann, E. and Weimann, T., “CEAC” in Wegen, G. and Wilske, S.  (eds.), Arbitration in 55 
Jurisdictions World wide, Global Arbitration Review (2011), at. pp. 10 and 12. 
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model clause arose out of a German – Chinese dispute where confusion arose after the 
Chinese party attempted to avoid the outdated Chinese Art. 96 CISG dec laration. That 
reservation reflected Chinese domestic contract law when first made but no longer 
does so given amendments now recognis ing freedom of form. Excluding the operation 
of this spec ific outdated Chinese Art. 96 CISG dec laration is the c lear intent of this 
clause. This intent is reinforced by further scholarly literature which emp has ises that 
the model clauses ‘evidence […] the efforts to tailor CEAC to the China market’. 110 
As this dispute of course demonstrates, the CEAC Rules can be used in arbitrations not 
implicating Chinese interests.111 CEAC statistics disclose that of the first seven cases 
administered by CEAC, four did not involve Chinese parties (though did have an 
‘indirect connection to China’).112 In this case, where Chinese interests and Chinese 
law are not in issue, there is much force in the view that the model choice of law 
clause (and thus Cl. 20) does not necessarily intend to exc lude Mediterraneo’s Art. 96 
CISG dec laration. This is reinforced by Art. 12 CISG which operationalises an Art. 96 
CISG dec laration and may not itself be derogated from or varied. 113 Thus the Tribunal 
considers, consistently with Mediterraneo Supply’s position, that Cl. 20 does not 
intend to and does not in fact exc lude the operation of Mediterraneo’s Art. 96 CISG 
declaration. 
However, the Tribunal also finds that this dec laration does not have the effect that 
Mediterraneo Supply contends and does not automatically infer positive written form 
requirements. The practical effect of Arts. 12 & 96 CISG is to remove Contracting 
States’ obligations to respect freedom of form, but they do not positively impose 
written form requirements, leaving an Art. 7(2) CISG internal gap. As there are no 
relevant CISG general principles to rely upon, private international law must be 
applied to identify the law governing form. This approach is supported in the 
literature.114 The Tribunal recognises there is a divis ion of opinion 115 however finds 
this so-called majority pos ition more persuasive, particularly as it is most consistent 
with a faithful application of Arts. 12 & 96 CISG’s text.116 
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  Supra fn 60, Brödermann,, at pp. 319-20; see also supra fn 101, at p. 143. 
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  CEAC Rules Preamble D. 
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  Supra fn 60, Brödermann,, at p. 304. 
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  See also CISG Art. 6. 
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The Tribunal agrees with Equatoriana Manufacturing that Equatorianian law governs 
form, does not impose any written form requirements,117 and thus oral modif ications 
are permitted at law. While Equatoriana Manufacturing relied on the c losest 
connection test as the applicable conflict of laws rule, this Tribunal prefers the 
cumulative approach, though the outcome is ultimately the same. The cumulative 
approach simultaneously applies the conflicts rules of all connected States and is 
preferred here as being the most predictable approach and thus most consistent with 
party expectation118 which is the guiding maxim of conflicts analyses. 119 The Tribunal 
feels supported in us ing this approach, notw ithstanding the absence of a doctr ine of 
binding precedent in arbitration,120 given it is frequently applied, for example in ICC 
practice.121 
Absent agreement, all three of Mediterraneo, Equatoriana and Danubia apply the 
closest connection test with a number of factors, including the characteristic 
performer’s domic ile and place of contract formation, being relevant. 122 Though 
having the potential for application in arbitration,123 no State connected to this dispute 
has adopted the Rome I Regulation124 thus it does not assist the Tribunal’s analysis in 
this case. 
The closest connection in this case lies with Equatoriana: 
1. As seller, Equatoriana Manufacturing undertakes characteristic performance;125 
2. The contract was concluded in Equatoriana; 126 and 
3. Adoption of the FAS Incoterm meant that r isk passed to Mediterraneo Supply 
upon delivery in Equatoriana. 127 
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As Mediterranean, Equatorianian and Danubian conflicts rules each require the 
application of Equatorianian law, that law governs form requirements in this case. As 
it contains no written form requirements,128 the parties’ contract may be orally 
amended as a matter of law. 
5.3. WAS THE PARTIES’ CONTRACT ORALLY AMENDED IN FACT? 
The third issue to be resolved in this Partial Award, and the final issue pertaining to 
Mediterraneo Supply’s claim for delay, is whether an oral amendment occurred in 
fact. The parties have diametrically opposed views as to the implications of the 9 
February 2011 telephone call on the original contrac tual delivery date. 129 This point of 
substance must ultimately be resolved under the CISG. 
5.3.1. MEDITERRANEO SUPPLY’S POSITION 
Mediterraneo Supply contended that the original 19 February 2011 delivery date in Cl. 
3 of the contract130 was not modified. It thus argues that as delivery occurred 5 days 
later on 24 February 2011, Equatoriana Manufacturing is in breach and an entitlement 
to US$ 27,500 accrues pursuant to the contract’s incentives provis ion in Cl. 10(b).  
5.3.2. EQUATORIANA MANUFACTURING’S POSITION 
Equatoriana Manufacturing contended that an amendment did occur during the 9  
February 2011 telephone call. It argued that the circumstances of that conversation 
satisfy the CISG’s requirements for a valid contractual modification and that as it 
delivered the “Yes Casual” polo shirts on the amended delivery date, it was not in 
breach. 
5.3.3. THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS AND DECISION 
Though the parties differ as to whether an amendment occurred, there is some 
common ground between them. Neither challenges Mr. Short or Mr. Long’s authority 
to modify the contract on behalf of their respective employers. Further, while neither 
witness remembers the exact wording used, both are sure that words along the lines of 
‘make sure that all of the paper work reflected the new delivery date’ were used.131 In 
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addition, both witnesses agree that Mr. Long never specif ically mentioned the 
contract.132 
After considering both witness statements, the circumstances of case as a whole and 
the requriements of the CISG, the Tribunal has decided that an amendment to the 
delivery date as alleged by Equatoriana Manufacturing did occur. 
Art. 29(1) CISG permits contractual amendments by “mere agreement” of the parties. 
No consideration is required, 133 thus the lack of return promise for the alleged 
extens ion of time is irrelevant in this case. The sole criter ion applicable is Art. 29(1) 
CISG’s requirement of “mere agreement”. This in turn requires assessment of the 
parties’ intentions in accordance with Art. 8 CISG. 
While, strictly, a “mere agreement” under Art. 29(1) CISG requires identif ication of 
an Art. 14 CISG offer and an Art. 18 CISG acceptance,134 the Tribunal does not find 
this analytical approach helpful. It prefers to take a commercially practical 
perspective135 and consider what is really at issue, namely whether in accordance with 
Art. 8 CISG the parties demonstrated an intent to modify the delivery date. Though 
mindful of its duty to apply the law,136 the Tribunal is satisfied that if such an intention 
can be found then a relevant Art. 14 CISG offer and Art. 18 CISG acceptance must 
necessarily exist. 
Art. 8 CISG adopts two separate tests for determining intent – a subjective test under 
Art. 8(1) CISG and failing that an object ive test under Art. 8(2) CISG. Both involve 
consideration of “all relevant circumstances”.137 Art. 8(1) CISG is of no assistance in 
this case – it cannot be said that either party “knew or could not have been unaware” 
of the other’s intent. Art. 8(1) CISG requires a subjective meeting of the minds138 
which is manifestly lacking in this case.139 Art. 8(1) CISG does not apply, thus as 
foreshadowed above the parties’ witness statements are of little relevance in resolving  
this issue – both speak to the subjective intentions of Mr. Long and Mr. Short and the 
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applicable provis ion which is Art. 8(2) CISG instead focusses on the objective 
circumstances of the case. 
In accordance with Procedural Order No. 2 140 the Tribunal has proceeded on the bas is 
that Mr. Long used words to the effect that he would ‘make sure that all of  the paper 
work reflected the new delivery date’. These words are the Tribunal’s starting point.141 
What would they mean to a reasonable bus iness person? To Mr. Short, the only 
relevant paperwork was the contract and letter of credit, while for Mr. Long it also 
inc luded Mediterraneo Supply’s shipping contract with TransOcean. 142 The word 
“all”, in its ordinary meaning, signifies both more than one item and also every item 
relevant to the parties. Though not conclusive, this analys is supports Equatoriana 
Manufacturing’s contention that an amendment occurred.  
Art. 8(3) CISG directs this Tribunal to consider “all relevant circumstances” which 
inc lude the parties’ negotiations. It is thus relevant, and is also uncontested, that 
timely delivery was emphas ised by Mediterraneo Supply and its importance 
understsood by Equatoriana Manufacturing.143 The “Yes Casual” line was to feature in 
a major Doma Cirun advertising campaign.144 Coupled with the contractual incentives 
provis ion in Cl. 10(b) which penalised lateness in daily increments but rewarded early 
delivery only on a weekly bas is, these circumstances support a conclus ion that 
objectively the parties (or at least Mediterraneo Supply) would not have intended to 
modify the delivery date. However, once again this consideration is not conclusive.  
What is most telling is an objective assessment of the parties’ subsequent conduct.145 
Follow ing the 9 February 2011 telephone call, Equatoriana Manufacturing delivered 
the “Yes Casual” polo shirts on 24 February 2011, those shirts were shipped to 
Mediterraneo Supply and the letter of credit was paid.146 The record contains no 
explicit reference to the amount paid, however on the basis that the  Statement of 
Claim147 seeks US$ 27,500 for late delivery and US$ 550,000 reimbursement of the 
purchase price, the Tribunal is prepared to infer 148 that the full contractual purchase 
price was paid. Clause 10(b) of the contract, upon which Mediterraneo Supply now 
relies, permits it to make “a deduction” from the purchase price. During oral 
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submissions some argument was directed at whether this clause actually confers an 
affirmative right to liquidated damages (as opposed to a deduction at the time of 
payment only) and also whether the delay claim is prejudiced by the fact that it was 
first clearly asserted only in the Statement of Claim.149 For present purposes, both 
points can be put to one side – though the Tribunal notes in pass ing that pursuant to 
Art. 10.2(1) UNIDROIT Principles 2010, chosen by the parties in Cl. 20 of the 
contract, a three-year limitation period applies given that prescription is not settled by 
the CISG.150 What is most important here is that at the time of delivery, Mediterraneo 
Supply’s conduct is consistent with an intention to modify during the 9 February 2011 
telephone call given that it did not exercise its express right of deduction. This is 
supported by the Doma Cirun letter in evidence which indicated it would claim 
damages for delay from Mediterraneo Supply151 which was never followed up by a 
similar communication from Mediterraneo Supply to Equatoriana Manufacturing, 
though the Tribunal notes that str ic tly only subsequent conduct of “the parties” is 
relevant under Art. 8(3) CISG. 
After considering all of the circumstances, and having particular regard to the parties’ 
subsequent conduct, the Tribunal considers that pursuant to Art. 8(2) CISG an 
intention to modify the delivery date from 19 February 2011 to 24 February 2011 is 
established and a “mere agreement” under Art. 29(1) CISG was reached. As 
Equatoriana Manufacturing delivered the “Yes Casual” polo shirts on that day at 
Oceanside, Equatoriana in accordance with the FAS Incoterm adopted in Cl. 2,  it is 
not in breach for delay. By way of interim conclusion, concerning the f irst three issues 
resolved in this Partial Award, Mediterraneo Supply is not entitled to the US$ 27,500 
claimed on account of delay.  
5.4. DOES THE CHILD LABOUR AGREEMENT EVIDENCE A BREACH 
OF CONTRACT, AND WAS MEDITERRANEO SUPPLY ENTITLED 
TO AVOID? 
The Tribunal turns now to the breaches of contract alleged by Mediterraneo Supply 
concerning the use of child labour. As explained in Part 4, this issue has been 
approached on the bas is of the parties’ agreement reached during the 4 October 2012 
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conference call. The Tribunal must decide whether those facts as agreed constitute a 
breach of contract justifying Mediterraneo Supply’s purported avoidance. 152 
The two distinct breaches of contract alleged by Mediterraneo Supply were outlined in 
Part 4. Mediterraneo Supply contended that either breach would be fundamental and 
entitle it to avoid. Equatoriana Manufacturing denied it breached either obligation, and 
in the alternative denied that any breach would be fundamental, thus Mediterraneo  
Supply at the very least was not entitled to avoid. 
5.4.1. THE FIRST ALLEGED BREACH – THE “YES CASUAL” POLO 
SHIRTS AND THEIR FITNESS FOR THEIR PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE 
The first breach alleged by Mediterraneo Supply is founded on Art. 35(2)(b) CISG and 
a failure of the “Yes Casual” polo shirts to conform to their particular purpose. Article 
35(2)(b) CISG reads: 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform 
with the contract unless they: 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to 
the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable 
for him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgment. 
Mediterraneo Supply argued that the particular purpose of the shirts was resale in 
Oceania. 153 During oral argument, it clarif ied that this should be understood as resale 
in Oceania, being an ethically-conscious consumer market. It contended that this 
purpose was impliedly made known to Equatoriana Manufacturing. Mediterraneo 
Supply asserted that as the media coverage of the child labour allegations tarnished 
Equatoriana Supply’s operations as a whole,154 and given the Oceanian consumer 
market’s reaction to the allegations, 155 the “Yes Casual” polo shirts were not f it for 
that particular purpose. In support of this core contention, Mediterraneo Supply relied 
on the German Federal Court of Justice decis ion in the New Zealand Mussels Case156 
which held that a seller must conform to statutory provis ions in a buyer’s State if also 
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applicable in its own State. The relevant statutory provis ions relied upon were those 
contained in the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour to which both 
Mediterraneo and Equatoriana are signatory. 157 
Equatoriana Manufacturing denied breaching Art. 35(2)(b) CISG. It did not make 
affirmative submissions concerning the making known of a particular purpose; it did 
not concede that point but instead noted that Mediterraneo Supply bears the burden of 
proof on that issue. 158 Its core submission was that no obligation under Art. 35(2)(b) 
CISG was imposed given a lack of reliance, or alternatively unreasonable relia nce, on 
its skill and judgment. In this regard it relied on Mediterraneo Supply’s failure to 
follow Oceania Plus Enterprises audit policy. 159 In essence, Equatoriana 
Manufacturing submitted that Mediterraneo Supply made a judgment call, and must 
now accept the consequences of that judgment call.  
The Tribunal has decided that Equatoriana Manufacturing did not breach Art. 35(2)(b) 
CISG. While the sale of goods in spec if ic markets may be a relevant particular 
purpose under the CISG160 and while it was most likely made known to Equatoriana 
Manufacturing that these goods were to be sold in Oceania, 161 Mediterraneo Supply 
cannot overcome the obstacle that the “Yes Casual” polo shirts were not themselves 
manufactured us ing child labour.162 The parties’ agreement concerning child labour 
does not extend that far.163 Article 35(2)(b) CISG requires that the goods to be f it for 
their particular purpose, and the “Yes Casual” polo shirts were themselves perfectly fit 
for sale. Article 35(2)(b) CISG says nothing about qualitative obligations to be 
imposed on suppliers and the practices they adopt. If any such obligations exist, they 
must be found in the express terms of the parties’ contract. 
 
                                              
157
  Statement of Claim, p. 11, para. 32; Statement of Defence, p. 36, para. 12. 
158
  Sch wenzer, I., “Article 35” in Sch wenzer, I.  (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer – Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG] , Oxford University Press, 3 rd ed. (2010) 568, at 
p. 594, para. 54; see also CEAC Rules Art. 27(1). 
159
  See generally Statement of Claim, p. 6, para. 9 & p. 11, para. 34; Claimant’s Exhibit No. 2, p. 14, paras. 
2-3; Statement of Defence, p. 35, para. 3; Procedural Order No. 2, pp. 51 -2, pararaphs 2-5. 
160
  Sch wenzer, I., “Conformity of the Goods – Physical Features on the Wane?” in Schwenzer, I. and 
Spagnolo, L. [eds.], State of Play – The 3rd Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference, Eleven 
International Publishing (2012) 103, at p. 107; Schwenzer, I. and Leisin ger, B., “Ethical Values an d 
International Sales Contracts” in Cranston, R., Ramberg, J. and Ziegel, J. (eds.),  Commercial Law 
Challenges in the 21st Century – Jan Hellner in Memorium, Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law 
Juridiska Institutionen (2007) 249, at p. 266. 
161
  Cf. Procedural Order No. 2, pp. 53-4, paras. 15-6. 
162
  Procedural Order No. 2, p. 54, para. 17; see also Claimant’s Exhibit No. 5, p. 18, para. 1; Claimant’s 
Exhibit No. 7, p. 21, para. 1. 
163
  Procedural Order No. 1, p. 49, para. 8. 
BEN JAMI N HA YW A RD ,  KEL SEY IP P OLIT O ,  OZGUR CELI K ,  NIC OLA MO RRI S 
AND ELLA  VINE S  
(2013) 17(2) VJ 229 - 264 256 
5.4.2. THE SECOND ALLEGED BREACH – THE “YES CASUAL” POLO 
SHIRTS AND CL. 12 OF THE PARTIES’ CONTRACT 
This brings the Tribunal to Mediterraneo Supply’s alternative argument, that 
Equatoriana Manufacturing breached Cl. 12. That clause reads: 
12. Policy. It is expected that all suppliers to Oceania Plus Enterprises or one of 
its subsidiaries will adhere to the policy of Oceania Plus Enterprises that they 
will conform to the highest ethical standards in the conduct of their business.  
Mediterraneo Supply argued that despite no use of child labour occurring w ith respect 
to the “Yes Casual” polo shirts, the plain wording of this clause is sufficiently broad to 
capture child labour use in Equatoriana Manufacturing’s general operations. It argued 
that if a narrow reading of Cl. 12 was intended, narrow wording would have been used 
– perhaps along the lines of ‘in the manufacture of the polo shirts the subject of this 
contract’. This was not the case and Mediterraneo Supply argued that Equatoriana 
Manufacturing breached Cl. 12 as an express term of the contract. 
Equatoriana Manufacturing contended that a narrow reading of Cl. 12, confining its 
operation to production of the specif ic “Yes Casual” polo shirts, was appropriate. It 
relied on the contractual context, commercial practicality cons iderations as well as the 
contra proferentum rule, and emphas ised to the Tribunal: 
1. Cl. 1 clearly establishes the sale of “Yes Casual” polo shirts as the subject-matter  
of the contract. This context informs how the “business” in Cl. 12 should be 
understood, ie. the bus iness between the parties in relation to this contract. 
2. The parties’ contract is a private arrangement with a commercial purpose, and is 
not a public policy instrument directed at eliminating child labour. The parties 
would not have intended Equatoriana Manufacturing be bound by a clause as 
onerous as Mediterraneo Supply’s reading of Cl. 12 suggests. It is not 
commercially practicable to treat Equatoriana Manufacturing as having agreed to a 
clause that would, for example, hold it respons ible for the conduct of independent 
suppliers carried out in the performance of unrelated contracts. 
3. Though sometimes associated with the common law,164 the contra proferentum 
rule is a general principle under Art. 7(2) CISG. 165 Clause 12 is a standard term of 
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Mediterraneo Supply,166 its ambiguity must be construed against Mediterraneo 
Supply, and it should therefore be read narrowly and confined to the “Yes Casual”  
polo shirts as Equatoriana Manufacturing contends. 
The Tribunal has decided that a breach of Cl. 12 is made out. The “highest ethical 
standards” referred to unquestionably prohibit the use of child labour; that is in fact a 
minimum ethical standard.167 Whilst the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour does not categorically and literally prohibit all child labour (only, as 
suggested, the worst forms) and while there is no agreement on the kind of child 
labour employed in this case, this is immaterial – this Tribunal is interpreting and 
applying Cl. 12 and not the terms of that Convention. Furthermore, the extension of 
Cl. 12 to Equatoriana Manufacturing’s bus iness as a whole is a necessary implication 
of the wording used. The Tribunal recognises this clause is onerous, though this 
construction is reasonable in a market where ‘reputation does indeed translate into 
financial value’ 168 and despite the clause being onerous, it is what Equatoriana Supply 
agreed to. Clause 12 is broad, but not ambiguous, and thus the contra proferentum rule 
cannot apply. 169 The parties’ agreement concerning child labour evidences a breach of 
Cl. 12 as contended by Mediterraneo Supply. 
5.4.3. WAS EQUATORIANA MANUFACTURING’S BREACH OF CL. 12 
A FUNDAMENTAL BREACH ENTITLING MEDITERRANEO 
SUPPLY TO AVOID? 
By letter dated 8 April 2011,170 Mediterraneo Supply purported to avoid the parties’ 
contract. For this avoidance to be justif ied, Art. 49(1)(a) CISG requires that 
Mediterraneo Supply show Equatoriana Manufacturing to be in fundamental breach of 
contract as defined in Art. 25 CISG. No issue of Nachfrist ar ises and in any event this 
is not a case of non-delivery;171 thus fundamental breach is the only possible 
justif ication for Mediterraneo Supply’s avoidance and if it cannot establish this, it is 
itself in fundamental breach of contract.172 
Fundamental breach is defined by Art. 25 CISG as requiring the satisfaction of two 
limbs. That provis ion reads as follows: 
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A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in 
such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee 
and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not 
have foreseen such a result. 
Mediterraneo Supply and Equatoriana Manufacturing are at odds with respect to both 
Art. 25 CISG limbs. Mediterraneo Supply contended that it placed sufficient 
importance on Cl. 12 such that any breach would involve a substantial deprivation of 
its expectations and qualify as fundamental.173 It supported this contention by 
referring to five factors: 
1. The existence of the Oceania Plus Enterprises group audit policy, which 
Equatoriana Manufacturing was subject to in 2007 / 2008.174 
2. That during this audit the Oceania Plus Enterprises group policy document was 
handed to Equatoriana Manufacturing. 175 
3. That during this audit the policy document was “extens ively discussed”.176 
4. That the Oceania Plus Enterprises group is well known for its high ethical 
standards which feature prominently on its website and other external 
communications. 177 
5. That ethical compliance is even embedded within the Oceania Plus Enterprises 
group’s corporate structure, though overlapping membership of subsidiary 
supervisory boards. 178 
It also submitted that Art. 25 CISG’s foreseeability limb sets only a low threshold and 
is satsif ied as the deprivation of its contractual expectations is self-evident from a 
reasonable person’s reading of the clear words of Cl. 12.179 It was not necessary for 
Equatoriana Manufacturing to spec ifically foresee the televis ion broadcast, newspaper 
artic le, or particular damage Mediterraneo Supply suffered.  
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Equatoriana Manufacturing emphas ised that it was entitled to succeed on this point 
should either limb of Art. 25 CISG be found lacking. It nevertheless argued that both 
limbs failed. With respect to the alleged deprivation of Mediterraneo Supply’s 
expectations, Equatoriana Manufacturing pointed to four instances of conduct it said 
were inconsistent with the alleged importance of Cl. 12: 
1. Mediterraneo Supply decided to contract with Equatoriana Manufacturing despite 
three key pieces of knowledge – the 2007 / 2008 audit concerns;180 that despite 
contrary media coverage, the termination of the plant manager’s employment at 
Equatoriana Manufacturing’s supplier was due to its int ervention follow ing those 
child labour concerns;181 and that other suppliers existed for whom Mediterraneo 
Supply had no specif ic concerns relating to ethical compliance. 182 
2. Evidence filed in these proceedings by Mediterraneo Supply itself discloses that 
Equatoriana Manufacturing was chosen over those other suppliers on the basis of 
differentials183 in price.184 
3. Mediterraneo Supply re-sold the “Yes Casual” polo shirts to Pacifica Trading 
Co185 as an alleged mitigatory measure; despite the fact that in its view the po lo 
shirts were tainted by the use of child labour; furthermore when this re-sale 
transaction occurred, Equatoriana Manufacturing was not specifically advised. 186 
4. Finally, when Mediterraneo Supply undertook a substitute purchase of polo shirts 
from Gold Service Clothing,187 it once again failed to follow Oceania Plus 
Enterprises group policy concerning the conduct of audits, even after the 
consequences of such a failure with respect to the present transaction. 188 
Equatoriana Manufacturing also contended that the foreseeability limb of Art. 25 
CISG must fail and in this regard emphasised that under the CISG avoidance is a 
remedy of last resort.189 It argued that on the basis of past transactions as evidenced in 
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the record, it lacked the Oceanian market knowledge as well as spec ific expeirence 
with Cl. 12 that would be required to make out foreseeability. Equatoriana 
Manufacturing had sold goods into the Oceanian market on three previous occasions 
but not to Mediterraneo Supply. 190 It had also sold goods to Mediterraneo Supply for 
subsidiaries of Oceania Plus Enterprises other than Doma Cirun in contracts 
containing a Cl. 12 equivalent, but those goods were not destined for Oceania.191 
Further, most previous supplies of clothing to Mediterraneo Supply were for on-sale to 
Atlantica Megastore subsidiaries.192 While the record is not explic it, the Tribunal was 
invited to draw the inference193 that Cl. 12 was a standard term only in contracts 
involving the Oceania Plus Enterprises group, and not Atlantica Megastores. This 
inference was said to be supported by the Statement of Claim,194 Procedural Order No. 
2195 and the terms of Cl. 12 itself. Equatoriana Manufacturing argued that both 
subjectively and objectively, it lacked the foreseeability of deprivation that Art. 25 
CISG requires. 
This issue was extremely contested in the parties’ written submissions as well as at the 
oral hearings, and has significant consequences for the resolution of this dispute. It has 
thus required careful cons ideration by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has decided that 
while a breach of Cl. 12 is made out, that breach was not fundamental as defined in 
Art. 25 CISG.  
The Tribunal f inds that the language of Cl. 12 is equivocal; the word “expected” can 
be both contrasted to other terms in the contract which use more definite language (eg. 
“agrees to sell” in Cl. 1) but also mirrors the language used in Art. 25 CISG. However, 
overall, the Tribunal agrees with Equatoriana Manufacturing’s contention that 
insufficient importance was placed on Cl. 12 such that breach of that c lause would 
substantially deprive Mediterraneo Supply of its contractual expectations. In 
particular, the Tribunal relies on Mediterraneo Supply’s re-sale of the “Yes Casual”  
polo shirts to Pacif ica Trading Co. An important factor in assessing fundamental 
breach is whether a buyer can put goods to “another reasonable use”. 196 This re-sale 
was ostensibly a mitigatory measure, yet Mediterraneo Supply is  (again) only required 
to take “reasonable” steps in mitigation197 and it is not reasonable to re-sell goods 
where doing so might damage a buyer’s reputation. 198 Furthermore, it is doubtful 
whether Mediterraneo Supply even had a relevant mitigation duty here pursuant to 
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Art. 77 CISG given that re-sale of the shirts was an effort to recoup the purchase price; 
recovery of the purchase price is at law a matter of restitution 199 rather than a matter of 
damages that must be mitigated. The fact that Mediterraneo Supply was willing to re-
sell what it considered to be tainted goods, when on either view of the mitigation 
question it was not required to do, is particularly illustrative of the lack of importance 
it placed on Cl. 12. That is not to say that Cl. 12 was not breached; as indicated above 
the Tribunal considers that a breach of Cl. 12 did occur. However, given the f irst limb 
of Art. 25 CISG fails, that breach was not fundamental. Because a fundamental breach 
requires satisfaction of both Art. 25 CISG limbs, it is not necessary for this Tribunal to 
reach a conclusion on the matter of foreseeability. 
As Equatoriana Manufacturing’s breach of Cl. 12 was not fundamental as defined in 
Art. 25 CISG, Mediterraneo Supply was not entitled to avoid the contract pursuant to 
Art. 49(1)(a) CISG. As Mediterraneo Supply was not entiteld to avoid, its purported 
avoidance placed Mediterraneo Supply itself in fundamental breach of contract.200 
6 FURTHER STEPS IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Partial Award, pursuant to the parties’ agreement,201 has considered issues of 
liability only and does not determine issues of quantum, interest or costs. The Tribunal 
retains jurisdiction over those matters and they are to be resolved by way of a Final 
Award after further submissions of the parties. In particular, the Tribunal notes 
(without express ing a view) that the parties’ respective successes on different issues in  
this Partial Award may poss ibly justify departure from the “in principle” rule in Art. 
42(1) CEAC Rules that costs follow the event. Should the parties reach settlement on 
these outstanding issues in the interim, the Tribunal ( in accordance with Art. 36(1) 
CEAC Rules) would consider whether that settlement should be formalised in a 
consent award.202 
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7 SUMMARY 
To summarise the Tribunal’s findings and decis ions reached in this dispute so far:  
1. The witness statement of Mr. Tomas Short is admissible evidence in  these 
proceedings. 
2. As a matter of law, oral amendments to the parties’ contract were permitted.  
3. As a matter of fact, an oral amendment to the delivery date in the parties’ contract 
did occur. 
4. As the contractual delivery date was amended from 19 February 2011 to 24 
February 2011 and Equatoriana Manufacturing delivered on 24 February 2011, no 
breach of the obligation to deliver on time occurred. 
5. Mediterraneo Supply is therefore not entitled to the US$ 27,500 claimed under Cl. 
10(b) of the contract. 
6. Equatoriana Manufacturing did not deliver goods in breach of the Art. 35(2)(b) 
CISG fitness for particular purpose term.  
7. Equatoriana Manufacturing did deliver goods in breach of Cl. 12 of the parties’ 
contract. 
8. That breach was not fundamental. 
9. Mediterraneo Supply was therefore not entitled to avoid the contract.  
10. By purporting to avoid the contract when it was not entitled to do so, Mediterraneo 
Supply itself was in fundamental breach of contract. 
These findings and decis ions are based on the reasons set out and explained in full in 
Part 5 of this Partial Award. 
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8 AWARD 
Having cons idered Mediterraneo Supply and Equatoriana Manufacturing’s 
submissions concerning the four issues disputed at this stage of the proceedings, in 
light of the evidence before this Tribunal and in light of the applicable law, the 
Tribunal hereby renders the following Partial Award: 
1. Mediterraneo Supply’s claim for US$ 27,500 on account of delay is dismissed. 
2. Mediterraneo Supply’s claim for breach of contract relating to Art.  35(2)(b) 
CISG is dismissed. 
3. Mediterraneo Supply has established Equatoriana Manufacturing’s liability for 
damages on account of breaching Cl. 12 of the contract, the quantum of such 
liability to be determined at a later stage in these proceedings.  
4. Those of Mediterraneo Supply’s claims which are contingent upon a f inding 
of valid avoidance are dismissed. 
5. The Tribunal retains jurisdiction to determine the quantum of damages 
referred to in item 3, as well as the parties’ claims for interest and costs, by 
way of a Final Award to be rendered in due course. 
This Partial Award, with respect to these matters, is final and binding on the parties. 
The Tribunal extends its s incere apprec iation to both parties and their counsel for the 
professional spirit in which these proceedings have been conducted. 
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